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MEXICO’S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES TO PROTECT 
IRREGULAR WOMEN TRANSMIGRANTS: APPLYING A 
GENDER LENS TO MIGRATION LAW REFORM 
Alyson L. Dimmitt Gnam† 
Abstract: Mexico is a transit country for hundreds of thousands of migrants 
traveling north.  Due to economic liberalization, women increasingly migrate in search of 
employment opportunities, a phenomenon called the “feminization of migration.”  As 
women migrate, they face high risks of sexual and gender-based violence, including 
sexual assault, rape, kidnapping, and trafficking.  During transit, the impunity of 
organized criminal groups and corrupt state officials facilitate rampant abuse of women.  
Mexico’s former migration policy exacerbated women’s vulnerability to abuse by 
criminal organizations by pushing women into dangerous illicit migration channels.  In 
response to the abuse of transmigrants, Mexico passed a sweeping migration reform bill 
in May of 2011, effective as of November 2012.  While the law’s rhetoric recognizes 
women as a vulnerable group, applying a gender lens to the law reveals that it fails to 
create structures that will adequately mitigate or prevent abuses of women migrants.  
True protection of women migrants requires a regional solution that responds to the 
gendered economic factors propelling migration, creating legal migration channels for 
women labor migrants in order to alter vulnerable patterns of transit.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 13, 2009, Nancy, a twenty-four-year-old Salvadoran migrant 
heading north to the United States, stayed at a shelter in Veracruz, a state in 
southern Mexico.1  While there, members of the criminal group the Zetas 
arrived at the shelter in large trucks and abducted her and 83 other migrants.2  
The trucks took them to Reynosa, Tamaulipas on the United States.-Mexico 
border.3  Mexican immigration authorities and Federal Police they passed 
along the way accepted bribe money to waive them along.4  During the 
journey, the kidnappers sexually abused Nancy and the other kidnapped 
                                                      
† The author would like to thank Professor Sara Ainsworth for her support and critical attention to 
women’s experience of the law, as well as Gretchen Kuhner, Director of the Instituto para las Mujeres en la 
Migración A.C. (Institute for Women in Migration), for her invaluable review of this work.   
1 Nancy’s story was collected by a human rights organization through an interview with a migrant 
victim.  Maureen Meyer & Stephanie Brewer, A Dangerous Journey Through Mexico: Human Rights 
Violations Against Migrants in Transit, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM., 4, 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Mexico/2010/DangerousJourney.pdf.  
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
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women; when a male migrant attempted to defend the women, he was raped 
by the kidnappers and beaten to death.5   
In Reynosa, two of the women with Nancy paid the ransom asked by 
the kidnappers and were released. 6  Unwilling to continue their journey, they 
turned themselves in to Mexican immigration authorities.7  These officials 
then sold the women back to the Zetas.8    The kidnappers brought the 
women back to the house, killed them, and displayed their bodies in front of 
Nancy and the other hostages.9    
The kidnapper “bosses,” three Mexican men, sexually abused Nancy 
and the other women regularly.10  The “bosses” raped Nancy several times.11  
The Zetas proposed that Nancy work for them, smuggling people from El 
Salvador; she agreed at first, hoping to escape, but then became afraid and 
declined their offer.12  She waited fifteen days for her aunt to gather the 
money required for her ransom before she was set free.13  
Many women who migrate from Mexico to the United States can tell a 
story similar to Nancy’s.  Mexico to the United States is the principal 
migration corridor in the world,14 hosting the transmigration15 of hundreds of 
thousands of Latin American migrants on their journey to the United 
States.16  The term “feminization of migration” reflects the shift in migration 
patterns as women increasingly join migration flows as labor migrants. 17 In 
                                                      
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 COMISIÓN NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMAN MEXICO (CNDH), INFORME ESPECIAL SOBRE 
SECUESTRO DE MIGRANTES EN MÉXICO [SPECIAL REPORT ON THE KIDNAPPING OF MIGRANTS IN MEXICO] 5 
(Feb. 2011) [hereinafter CNDH 2011].  
15 “Transmigration” refers to the journey through a country only as part of the route from origin 
country to destination country.  In this case, Mexico is the overland route for migrants coming from the 
south as they move north to the United States and Canada.   
16 Patricia Cortés Castellanos, CELADE UNFPA, Mujeres migrantes de América Latina y el Caribe: 
derechos humanos, mitos y duras realidades [Women Migrants of Latin America and the Caribbean: 
Human Rights, Myths and Harsh Realities], at 34, U.N. Doc. LC/L.2426-P/1680-9009, U.N. Sales No. 
S.05.II.G.173 (Nov. 2005); Amnesty Int’l, Invisible Victims: Migrants on the Move in Mexico, at 3, AI 
Index No. AMR 41/014/2010 (2010), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/014/20
10/en/8459f0ac-03ce-4302-8bd2-3305bdae9cde/amr410142010eng.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty 2010]; 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (HRC), REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF 
MIGRANTS, JORGE BUSTAMANTE: MISSION TO MEXICO, INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., Report No. A/HRC/11/ 
7/Add.224 (Mar. 24, 2009), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G09/125/76/PDF/ 
G0912576.pdf?OpenElement. 
17 Gloria Moreno Fontes Chammartin, International Labour Organization, The feminization of 
international migration, in MIGRANT WORKERS, LABOUR EDUCATION No. 129, 39 (2002), available at 
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Latin America, gender shapes migration processes as women make the 
difficult choice to migrate in response to the lack of employment 
opportunities due to economic and trade liberalization in Central America 
and the increased demand for female migrant labor in destination 
countries. 18  The majority of women transmigrating Mexico are Central 
Americans destined for the United States.19  Women account for 10% to 
30% of the northward migration flow of Central Americans in Mexico, and 
up to half of the migrant population in the United States.20   
Irregular migrants21 who traverse Mexico (who are mostly Central 
Americans without legal status in Mexico) undertake one of the most 
dangerous migration journeys in the world.22  Organized criminal groups 
kidnap more than 20,000 migrants in situations similar to Nancy’s each 
year.23  In 2011, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Special 
Rapporteur received many reports of migrants held in Mexico with hundreds 
of other captives and subjected to beatings, rape, gang rape, extortion, sexual 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_dialogue/@actrav/documents/publication/wcms_111462.p
df; Donato et al., A Glass Half Full? Gender in Migration Studies, 40 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 3, 5 (2006). 
See also UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW), 
The Feminization of International Labor Migration, Gender, Remittances, and Development Working 
Paper 1 (2007), available at http://www.renate-europe.net/downloads/Documents/Feminization_of_ 
Migration-INSTRAW2007.pdf [hereinafter INSTRAW]. 
18 INSTRAW, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
19 Patricia R. Pessar, Women, Gender, and International Migration Across and Beyond the 
Americas: Inequalities and Limited Empowerment, 2, UN/POP/EGM-MIG/2005/08 (Nov. 28, 2005), 
available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/IttMigLAC/P08_PPessar.pdf; Saskia Sassen, 
Women’s Burden: Counter-Geographies of Globalization and the Feminization of Survival, 53 J. OF INTL. 
AFFAIRS 504, 511-12 (2000). 
20 The discrepancy is likely to due to less circular migration.  Gabriela Diaz & Gretchen Kuhner, 
Women Migrants in Transit and Detention in Mexico, Migration Information Source, March 2007, 
available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=586.  Circular migration refers 
to repetitive migration to the destination country, return to the home country, and migration again.  Studies 
suggest that women do less circular migration because of maternity, the danger of the journey, and 
economic reasons.  Gretchen Kuhner, La Violencia Contra Las Mujeres Migrantes en Tránsito por México 
[The Violence against Women Migrants in Transition for Mexico], DFESNOR, 20 (June 2011), available at 
http://www.imumi.org/attachments/DFensor_Junio_2011_Migracion_Asilo_y_ Refugio.pdf.  Women tend 
to pay larger sums of money to traffickers to avoid detention, making it more difficult to discern their 
presence in the migration flow.  Gabriela Díaz Prieto y Grechen Kuhner, Globalización y Migración 
Femenina: Experiencias en México [Globalization and Feminine Migration: Experiences in Mexico], CEPI 
WORKING PAPER NO. 12, Sec. V.1. (Dec. 2007), available at http://interamericanos.itam.mx/working_pape
rs/12KUHNER.pdf. 
21 This comment uses “irregular migrants” to identify migrants whose entry or presence in a country 
has not been legally sanctioned. 
22 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 5. 
23 COMISSION NACIONAL DE LOS DERECHOS HUMAN MEXICO (CNDH), INFORME ESPECIAL SOBRE 
SECUESTRO DE MIGRANTES EN MÉXICO [SPECIAL REPORT ON THE KIDNAPPING OF MIGRANTS IN MEXICO], 
at 12 (June 2009) [hereinafter CNDH 2009] (English translation available at http://www.cndh.org.mx/Infor
mes_Especiales) (estimating 18,000 per year); CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 26 (estimating 22,000 per 
year). 
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exploitation, and human trafficking.24  While criminal organizations target 
men and women migrants, women’s experience of exploitation includes a 
unique and extremely high risk of sexual and gender-based violence. 25  
While all transmigrants in Mexico face a high risk of violence during transit, 
women irregular migrants are the “vulnerable among the vulnerable.”26 
Until 2011, the 1974 Ley General de Población (“General Population 
Law” (“LGP”)) and its regulations issued in 2000 governed the rights of 
migrants traveling into or through Mexico.27  The LGP did not provide legal 
migration channels for transmigrants, while increased enforcement efforts 
during the last ten years sought to stem migration from Central America.28  
This restrictive migration regime pushed migrants, especially women, into 
illicit migration channels and human smuggling situations that made them 
more vulnerable to kidnapping, sexual violence, and human trafficking.29  
The gendered impact of Mexican migration policy included rampant 
impunity for abuses of migrants, increasing women migrants’ vulnerability 
to violence by organized criminal groups.30 
Mexico finally responded to longstanding calls for migration policy 
reform31 and growing international attention on the abuses of migrants in 
                                                      
24 Annex to Press Release, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), Preliminary 
Observations of the IACHR’s Rapporteurship on the Rights of Migrants Workers on Its Visit to Mexico, 
IACHR Press Release 82/11, 8 (Aug. 2, 2011) [hereinafter IACHR Rapporteur 2011].  
25 Jorge Martínez Pizarro, CELADE UNFPA, El Mapa Migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, 
las mujeres y el genero [The Migration Map of Latin America and the Caribbean, Women and Gender], at 
8, U.N. Doc. LC/L.1974-P/E/WP.44, U.N. Sales No. S:03.II.G.133 (2003), available at 
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/2/13732/lcl1974_P.pdf; Amnesty Int’l, Briefing to the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women for its 52nd Sess., at 15, AI Index No. 
AMR 41/041/2012 (July 2012), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/ngos/Amne
styInternationalForTheSessionMexico_CEDAW52.pdf. 
26 Martínez Pizarro, supra note 25, at 58. 
27 Ley General de Población [LGP] [General Population Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 
1 de Enero de 1974 (the LGP cited herein, unless otherwise noted, refers to the verion of the law prior to 
2011 revisions); Reglamento de la Ley General de Población [RLGP] [Regulations for the General 
Popuation Law], Diario Oficial, 14 de abril de 2000. 
28 See, e.g., LGP art. 119, 122, 123; Francisco Alba & Manuel Ángel Castillo, New Approaches to 
Migration Management in Mexico and Central America, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 6 (2012), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-MexCentAm-Migration.pdf. 
29 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 5; Olivia Ruiz, Migration and Borders: Present and Future 
Challenges, 33 LATIN AM. PERSP. 46, 50 (2006). 
30 Both migrants in transit as well as Mexican citizens are victims of abuses.  CNDH 2011, supra 
note 14, at 27 (more than 10% of kidnapping victims were Mexican).  This comment will focus on non-
Mexican migrants with irregular status, as the rights of Mexican nationals in their own nation are not 
governed by the Migration Law, except briefly.  See Reglamento de la Ley de Migración [RLM] 
[Regulations for the Migration Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], ch.9 art. 215, 28 de Septiembre 
de 2012 (Mex.) [hereinafter RLM] (providing that the INM should contribute to making sure the entrance, 
stay and exit of Mexican emigrants from Mexico respects their rights and security).  See also Ley de 
Migración [LM] [Migration Law], art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 25 de Mayo de 2011 (Mex.) 
[hereinafter LM]; RLM, ch. 10 (supporting repatriation of returning Mexican emigrants). 
31 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 13-14.   
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Mexico. 32   On May 25, 2011, Mexico passed the Ley de Migración 
(“Migration Law”), repealing the LGP entirely as it pertained to migration.33  
The former Mexican president Felipe Calderón called the law the most 
sweeping change to Mexican immigration policy since the LGP was 
enacted.34  The law went into effect in November 2012, after Mexico issued 
regulations on September 24, 2012 (the Reglamento de la Ley de Migración 
(“RLM”)).35  
The Migration Law regulates immigration to Mexico, emigration and 
return of Mexican citizens, and migrants during transit through Mexico.36  
The law acknowledges the human rights of migrants and explicitly 
recognizes women as a vulnerable group of migrants. 37   However, this 
comment concludes that the Migration Law fails to actually adjust or create 
structures that would change the primary factors contributing to women’s 
vulnerability to abuse. By failing to provide migrants in transit with legal 
migration channels, maintaining enforcement powers of immigration and 
other state officials, and continuing punitive enforcement structures, the 
policy will continue to place women migrants in positions vulnerable to 
sexual and gender-based violence.  
This comment applies a gender lens to the migration experience in 
order to evaluate how the Migration Law responds to the feminization of 
migration and the abuse of women migrants.  Part II of this comment 
considers the experience of irregular women transmigrants in Mexico38 and 
their risk of sexual and gender-based violence.  This analysis addresses two 
of the factors perpetuating women migrants’ vulnerable position:  increased 
female migration due to regional economic liberalization and the symbiotic 
                                                      
32 This attention includes the report and hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights on March 22, 2010, the Amnesty International Report in 2010, and the sixth report on the situation 
of human rights of migrant by civil society groups.  CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 32-38. 
33 LM art. 1.  
34 Migration Policy Institute (MPI), Top 10 of 2011 Issue #10: Caught Between Two Migration 
Realities, Mexico Passes New Immigration Legislation, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Dec. 2011), available 
at http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=871.   
35 RLM preamble. 
36 LM art. 1. 
37 See, e.g., LM art. 2, 133. 
38 This comment addresses only abuses occurring in Mexican territory.  They occur throughout the 
national territory, with 67% of kidnapping events having happened in southeast Mexico and 29% in 
northern Mexico.  CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 27.  Crossing the northern border also includes high risks 
of sexual and gender-based violence against women migrants, which, though beyond the scope of this 
comment, are necessarily aspects of women’s experiences.  See Sylvana Falcón, Rape as a Weapon of War: 
Militarized Rape at the United States-Mexico Border, in WOMEN AND MIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES-
MEXICO BORDERLANDS: A READER 202-223 (Denise Segura & Patricia Zavella, eds. 2007); IACHR, 
SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS AND THEIR FAMILIES, ON SITE VISIT TO 
MEXICO, in ANNUAL REPORT, ¶¶ 208-212 (2003), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/Migrantes/2003.eng.cap5c.htm [hereinafter IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2003]. 
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corruption of state officials and impunity of organized criminal groups.  Part 
III considers the role of Mexico’s prior migration law regime in pushing 
women migrants into migration channels with high risks of sexual and 
gender-based violence.  Part IV then analyzes the probable ability of the new 
Migration Law to reduce women’s vulnerable position during migration. 
Part V proposes that ultimately, prevention of abuses of women migrants 
requires a regional migration policy that reflects the socioeconomic reality 
of labor migration in the region by providing legal migration channels to 
women heading north. 
 
II. A GENDER LENS REVEALS FACTORS THAT CREATE CONDITIONS OF 
VULNERABILITY TO SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE FOR 
WOMEN MIGRANTS 
 
Mexico’s migration policy, both the LGP’s former migration regime 
and the new Migration Law must be understood within the context of 
Mexico as a country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants.  Mexico 
is the top emigration country in the world39 and sends more of its citizens to 
the United States than any other country in the world sends to a single 
destination.40  In 2010, more than 400,000 Mexicans emigrated out of the 
country. 41   About 11.7 million Mexican-born people, roughly 12% of 
Mexico’s population, live in the United States.42  In contrast, foreign-born 
persons in Mexico represent only 0.86% of Mexico’s total population 
(0.19% excluding those born in the United States).43 Because of the large 
population of Mexican citizens living as migrants aboard, Mexico has taken 
a position of global leadership to advocate for the rights of migrants 
internationally and in the United States. 44  
                                                      
39 IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2003, supra note 38, at 3.  
40 Jeffry Passel, et al. Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero-and Perhaps Less, PEW HISPANIC 
RESEARCH CENTER (May 3, 2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/23/net-migration-from-mexico-
falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/#fn-13587-1 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013). 
41 Consejo Nacional de Poblacion [CONAPO], Indicadores Demograficos Basicos 1990-2010: 
Nacional, [Basic Demographic Indicators 1990-2010: National], CONAPO, http://www.conapo.gob.mx/es/ 
CONAPO/Indicadores_Demograficos_Basicos_1990-2010 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013).  See also Lucy 
Williams, Cross-Border Reflections on Poverty: Lessons from the United States and Mexico, in LAW AND 
POVERTY: THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND POVERTY REDUCTION 31, 34-35 (Lucy Williams, Asbjørn Kjønstad & 
Peter Robson eds., 2003) (relating high levels of Mexico-United States migration to the history of labor 
market ties serving United States industry and agricultural interests). 
42 Eileen Patten, Statistical Portrait of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States, 2010, PEW 
HISPANIC RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-
born-population-in-the-united-states-2010/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
43 Manuel Ángel Castillo, Extranjeros en México, 2000-2010 [Foreigners in Mexico, 2000-2010], 2 
CONYUNTURA DEMOGRÁFICA 57, 58 & 60 (2012), available at http://www.somede.org/coyuntura-
demografica/articulos/castillo-20120716.pdf. 
44 Mexico has long defended migrants’ rights, pursuing bilateral negotiation and advocacy with the 
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Mexico is also a country of transit for at least 109,000 people each 
year who travel north as irregular migrants,45 more than 75% destined for the 
United States. 46  Approximately 95% of these migrants are Central 
Americans, principally from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua. 47  A small number aim for Mexico, where 45,000 to 75,000 
migrant Guatemalans work temporarily in the south,48 while some women 
and youth seek employment in cities as domestic workers, sex workers, and 
in the informal service sector. 49   The following sections consider the 
experiences of women migrants during transit of this migration corridor in 
order to identify the factors influencing female migration and the probable 
impact of the new Migration Law on women migrants’ experience of 
violence. 
 
A.  Defining the “Gender Lens:” The Recognition of Gender in Migration 
Scholarship Acknowledges the Unique Influences and Experiences of 
Female Migration 
 
Until the 1970s, little attention was paid to the subject of gender in 
migration studies, as scholars assumed that women and children migrated to 
accompany or reunite with a breadwinning male partner. 50   Since then, 
scholars recognized that women have represented almost half of migrants 
                                                                                                                                                              
United States government, leading internationally with the drafting of the 1990 UN Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, and using public diplomacy and 
community organizing.  Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 3.  
45 Estimates vary from 109,000 irregular transmigrants through Mexico to 400,000.  IMUMI, Cifras 
de mujeres en la migración, 13 (2013) (citing Salvador Berumen, Juan Carlos Narváez, & Luis Felipe 
Ramos, La migración centroamericana de tránsito irregular por México.  Una proximación e los registros 
administrativos migratorios y otras Fuentes de información,” in CONSTRYENDO ESTADÍSTICAS. MOVILIDAD 
Y MIGRACIÓN INTERNATIONAL EN MÉXICO (Rodriguez, Salazar, and Martinez eds. 2012) (estimating 
109,000 based on statistics from the INM, United States Department of Homeland Security, and United 
States Border Patrol).  The Secretary of Governance puts the number at 150,000 in its February 2011 report, 
while civil society groups generally agree on a higher estimate of 400,000 based on the difficulty of 
accurately counting irregular migrants.  CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 5. 
46 Cortés Castellanos, supra note 16, at 34.   
47 Gobierno Federal de México, Informe del estado Méxicano de Secuestro, Extorsión y Otros 
Delitos Cometidos Contra Personas en Tránstio por Territorio Méxicano, at 12 (June 16, 2010), available 
at http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/administrador_de_carpetas/migracion_y_seguridad/pdf/INFOR
ME%20MIGRANTES-CIDH.pdf. 
48 IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2003, supra note 38, at ¶ 178. 
49 Díaz Prieto & Kuhner, supra note 20, at sec. VI.1. 
50 Donato et al., supra note 17, at 4-12 (outlining the history of gender in migration studies); Adele 
Jones, A Silent but Mighty River: The Costs of Women’s Economic Migration, 33 SIGNAL 761, 764 (2008) 
(noting the paucity even at the present day of adequate attention to female migration in economic migration 
studies); Pessar, supra note 19, at 2; Patricia R. Pessar & Sarah J. Mahler, Gender and Transnational 
Migration 2 (June 30-July 1, 2001) (paper given to the conference on Transnational Migration: 
Comparative Perspective, Princeton University), available at http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working% 
20papers/WPTC-01-20%20Pessar.doc.pdf. 
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globally since the 1960s, and today make up 51% of all migrants 
worldwide.51  Though previously women migrated primarily to join a partner, 
increasing numbers of women, both single and married, have begun moving 
on their own to find better employment, 52  particularly since economic 
liberalization policies affected developing nations in the 1980s.53  Migration 
scholars dub this global phenomenon the “feminization of migration.”54 
They have subsequently brought gender centrally into migration studies to 
remedy decades of inattention.55 
When scholars understand gender not as a comparison between male 
and female, but as a social dynamic that influences human relationships, 
decisions, and system, they better understand the unique forces and 
experiences that shape female migration distinctly from male migration. 56  
Migration scholars have come to understand “gender” as a social 
construction different from biological sex, not a comparative of female 
versus male migrants. 57  People make decisions to migrate within a context 
of gender interactions between individuals, families, and institutions, 58 
making gender a set of social relations that organize immigration patterns.59 
As scholars begin to understand the migration process as a gendered 
phenomenon, they recognize that traditional explanations for migration do 
not fully explain women’s choices and methods of migrating.60    Applying a 
gender lens to migration allows one to recognize the role of gender in the 
law and policy that influence migration choices and processes.61   
 Applying a gender awareness lens to the experience of migrants 
during transit through Mexico also reveals the unique consequences to 
women of the abuses and risks faced by all migrants in Mexico.  Women 
migrants experience high rates of sexual and gender-based violence.  
Gender-based violence is “violence that is directed against a woman because 
she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.  It includes acts 
                                                      
51 International Labour Organization (ILO), Preventing Discrimination, Exploitation and Abuse of 
Women Migrant Workers: An Information Guide Booklet 1 9, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/grou
ps/public/---ed_emp/documents/instructionalmaterial/wcms_116360.pdf [hereinafter ILO Guide]. 
52 Martínez Pizarro, supra note 25, at 53; Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 39; International 
Labour Organization (ILO), Migrant Workers, ¶ 20-22, 87th Sess. 1999 (June 1999), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/r3-1b.htm. 
53 E.g. Sassen, supra note 19, at 504-506. 
54 Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 39. 
55 See sources cited supra note 25. 
56 See Donato et al., supra note 17, at 6, 13; Jones, supra note 50, at 764-765. 
57 Donato et al., supra note 17, at 5-6; Pessar, supra note 19, at 2.   
58 Donato et al., supra note 17, at 5-6; Pessar, supra note 19, at 2.   
59 Pessar & Mahler, supra note 50, at 4. 
60 Donato et al., supra note 17, at 6, 13; Jones, supra note 50, at 764-765. 
61 Kitty Calavita, Gender, Migration, and Law: Crossing Borders and Bridging Disciplines, 40 INTL. 
MIGRATION REV. 104, 116 (2006); Donato et al., supra note 17, at 6. 
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that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of acts, 
coercion and other deprivations of liberty.”62  Sexual violence includes rape, 
sexual abuse, sexual intimidation, trafficking, and forced prostitution.63   
This comment utilizes the definition of gender supplied by migration 
scholars to consider the experience of women migrants transiting Mexico.  
Examining transmigration with an awareness of gendered influences and 
experiences is necessary to understand the gendered impact of law and 
policy on choices to migrate.  This improved understanding of the role of 
gender, both in factors propelling certain patterns of migration as well as the 
effect of violence during migration, is essential to understanding the needs 
of women migrants and the potential of the Migration Law to meet those 
needs. 
 
B. The Experience of Women Migrants in Transit Reveals a Crisis of 
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Irregular Migrants 
 
The feminization of migration holds true for migrants in transit 
through Mexico.  Women make up about 20% of migrants in transit through 
Mexico, but half of the migrant population in the destination country. 64  
More than 75% of women in one study migrated north in search of work so 
they could save money to send home.65  These women were motivated not 
by unemployment, but by the prospect of better earnings; prior to migration 
most women worked but earned an average annual income of only USD 
$3,875.66  The majority planned to stay in the United States for only three to 
five years to save money, then return to their country of origin.67  Nearly half 
                                                      
62 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, General 
Recommendation No. 19 by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), 11th Sess. ¶ 6 (1992), available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendatio
ns/recomm.htm#recom19.  Sexual violence includes rape, sexual abuse, sexual intimidation, trafficking, 
and forced prostitution.  Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104, ¶ 
17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104, art. 2(b) (Dec. 20, 1993), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/4
8/a48r104.htm [hereinafter DEVAW].  
63 DEVAW, supra note 62, at art. 2(b). 
64 Diaz & Kuhner, supra note 20.  This discrepancy is likely due to women’s lower rates of circular 
migration, the repetitive migration to the destination country, return to the home country, and migration 
again.  Studies suggest that women do less circular migration because of maternity, the danger of the 
journey, and economic reasons.  Kuhner, supra note 20, at 20.  In addition, women tend to pay larger sums 
of money to traffickers to avoid detention, making it more difficult to discern their presence in the 
migration flow.  Diaz Prieto & Kuhner, supra note 20, at § V.1. 
65 Diaz & Kuhner, supra note 20 (data based on a study of women in detention).  
66 Id.; Martinez Pizarro, supra note 25, at 55. 
67 Diaz & Kuhner, supra note 20. 
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of women migrants were from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.68  
Among the women from Central America, 94% had left children behind.69  
 Women migrants experience the abuses common to all migrants, 
including kidnapping, extortion, and physical violence, but also the unique 
experience of sexual and gender-based violence.70  Women face such a high 
risk of rape and sexual assault that many consider it part of the sacrifice for 
their journey north.71  Some human rights organizations estimate that six in 
ten women and girl migrants experience rape during their transit,72 while 
other service providers in the field estimate eight in ten women migrants 
experience rape and other forms of sexual assault.73  Another study by the 
Instituto Nacional de Salud Pública (National Institute of Public Health) in 
which researchers interviewed 750 migrants in one shelter in Tapachula, 
Mexico, indicated lower rates of sexual violence for women, but much 
higher incidents of sexual violence against women than against men.74  Rape 
is so prevalent that smugglers sometimes require women to take 
contraceptives prior to traveling north.75  
 The epidemic of migrant kidnapping for extortion creates the 
conditions for widespread sexual violence against women migrants. The 
Mexican National Human Rights Commission (“CNDH”) issued reports in 
2009 and 2011 on the kidnappings of migrants. Over a six-month period 
from 2008 to 2009, perpetrators kidnapped 9,758 migrants;76 in the first six 
months of 2011, they kidnapped 11,333 victims.77  These studies indicate 
                                                      
68 Id.   
69 Id. 
70 While girls may also be victims to these same crimes, this comment does not address the situation 
of minors in migration.  The Migration Law provides unique regulations around minors, especially 
unaccompanied migrant youth, but those regulations are beyond the scope of this analysis.  See RLM art. 
169-177.   
71 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 15. 
72 Id.  
73 José Morales, Violadas, 8 de cada 10 mujeres migrantes (July 1, 2008), ONGINFO.COM, 
http://ong.tupatrocinio.com/violadas-de-cada-mujeres-migrantes-noticia-732.html. 
74 This study found that 8.3% of women surveyed reported forced sexual intercourse during their 
journey (compared to 2.1% of male migrants), while 28.2% reported some type of exchanging sexual 
relationship for goods or services (transportation, food, protection, or money) (compared to 1.4% of male 
migrants).  INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE SALUD PÚBLICA (INSP), MIGRACIÓN Y SALUD SEXUAL Y 
REPRODUCTIVE EN LA FRONTERA SUR DE MÉXICO, 100, table 5.5 (René Leyva Flores and Frida Quintino 
Pérez, eds., 2011), available at http://umys.insp.mx/docs/publicaciones/MigracionSSRMexElectronico.pdf.  
The representative quality of these numbers is unknown; though more precise than the 60% estimate, it is 
based only on a small population of migrants still at Mexico’s southern border.  Id.  Reluctance to report or 
recognize sexual violence might also lead to misrepresentative numbers.  See Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, 
at 15. 
75 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 15. 
76 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 9, 12 (noting this is likely an underestimate, given the impossibility 
of detecting all victims during this period). 
77 CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 26. 
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that at least 18,000-20,000 migrants are kidnapped per year. 78   In both 
studies the largest number of victims were from Honduras, then El Salvador, 
then Guatemala; in 2011, 10% of victims were Mexican.79  Abusers induce 
or forcibly capture migrants traveling or staying in shelters, take them to 
“safe houses,” and force them to give up the names of family members who 
will pay a ransom for their release. 80  Kidnappers usually subject migrants to 
beatings and torture81 and often kill migrants who do not have a way to pay 
the ransom.82  Women experience systematic sexual abuse and rape while 
kidnapped,83 and are sometimes sold into prostitution.84 
Migration also makes women vulnerable to human trafficking, 85 
another form of sexual and gender-based violence.  More than 20,000 
persons are victims of human trafficking in Mexico each year, 
predominantly near borders and in tourist destinations.86  The International 
Organization for Migration (“IOM”) has provided direct assistance to 
trafficking victims since 2005, during which time women represented more 
than 80% of trafficking victims.87  Most victims were Central American 
                                                      
78 Id.; STEVEN DUDLEY, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL 
AMERICA: ITS EVOLUTION AND ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/RMSG-TransnationalCrime.pdf. 
79 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 13; CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 27. 
80 Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1, at 3; CNDH 2009, supra note 23; CNDH 2011, supra note 14. 
81 See supra note 80.   
82 Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1, at 3. 
83 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 12-13; Secuestros a Personas Migrantes en Tránsito por México, 
Report from civil society groups for the U.N. Committee for the Protection of the Right of Migrants and 
Their Families (March 4, 2011), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/docs/ngos/prodh_
Mexico_CAT47.pdf. 
84 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at; Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1 at 3. 
85 “Trafficking in persons” is defined as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or 
receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, 
of deception…for the purpose of exploitation.  Exploitation shall include . . . prostitution of others or other 
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery . . . ” Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nationas 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 25 (II), U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Supp. No. 
49, at 60, U.N. Doc. A.55.49 (Vol. 1) at art. 3(a), (Dec. 25, 2003). 
86 Press Release, International Organization for Migration, IOM and Mexico’s National Human 
Rights Commission Sign Cooperation Agreement to Fight Human Trafficking and the Kidnapping of 
Migrants in Mexico (Sep. 14, 2010), http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/news-and-views/press-
briefing-notes/pbn-2010/pbn-listing/iom-and-mexicos-national-human-rights-c.html; HRC, supra note 16, 
at ¶ 49.  
87 HÉLÈN LE GOFF & THOMAS LOTHAR WEISS, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, LA TRATA DE PERSONAS 
EN MÉXICO: DIAGNÓSTICO SOBRE LA ASISTENCIA A VÍCTIMAS 12, 49 (2011), available at 
http://www.oim.org.mx/pdf/La%20Trata%20de%20personas_diagnostico2.pdf.  The predominance of 
women as the victims of trafficking, especially international trafficking, is consistent with international 
trends, where the majority of trafficking victims are women and girls.  CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL332006, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 4 (2011). 
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females between eight and twenty-two years old, the large majority from 
Guatemala.88   
Women are victims of both sex trafficking as well as labor trafficking; 
those trafficked for labor are usually also victims of sexual and gender-based 
violence.  Of the victims working with the IOM, 70% were victims of labor 
trafficking.89  Traffickers subjected many of those trafficked for non-sexual 
exploitation to sexual violence as a method of control.90  Another 24% were 
victims of sexual exploitation, including forced prostitution and sex 
tourism.91  Abductors or coyotes, paid guides facilitating migration,92 sell 
women to organized criminal groups who force them into prostitution or 
domestic work in buildings where they hold kidnapped migrants.93  In some 
cases, criminal organization kidnapped girls and adolescents and sold them 
to owners of bars and nightlife establishments for sex work.94  For those not 
forcibly abducted, most of the “recruitment” by traffickers occurred in 
public places in towns near the southern border.95  Irregular migrant women 
and girls are vulnerable at border locations because they have a strong desire 
to get to or across the United States border but lack migration documentation 
or sufficient knowledge about the risks of migration to counter the promises 
made by traffickers.96 
 
C. Gendered Impacts of Economic Policy and Criminal Impunity Create 
Conditions of Vulnerability to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
Against Women Migrants 
 
In light of the high risk of rape, sexual assault, and trafficking for 
women migrants, the following sections consider the factors creating the 
conditions that make women migrants vulnerable to abuse.  First, women are 
in the irregular migration flow because economic liberalization in Central 
America increasingly propels women to choose international labor migration 
in order to find alternative income sources. 97   Second, women are 
particularly vulnerable while in that migration flow, due in part to the 
                                                      
88 LE GOFF & WEISS, supra note 87, at 49.  See also IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2011, supra note 24 
(Central American women and girls are particularly victimized by trafficking and forced into prostitution, 
often along Mexico’s southern border). 
89 LE GOFF & WEISS, supra note 87, at 83. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 77. 
92 Dudley, supra note 78, at 12. 
93 Id. at 13, 15. 
94 LE GOFF & WEISS, supra note 87, at 80. 
95 Id. at 63. 
96 Id. 
97 Pessar, supra note 19, at 2.  
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environment of impunity for criminal groups and corrupt state officials who 
facilitate sexual and gender-based violence.98   
 
1. Economic Liberalization and the Need for Alternative Income Sources 
Compels the Choice of Labor Migration for Women  
 
 Migration through Mexico has shifted from conflict-driven patterns to 
economic-driven patterns.  The migration of Central Americans to and 
through Mexico began in the 1980s as people fled civil conflicts in Central 
America.99  Migration continued post-conflict,100 with 63% of Guatemalan, 
Honduran, and El Salvadoran immigrants arriving in the United States after 
1990.101  These migrations created established networks of irregular entry 
and transit through Mexico to the United States.102  In the United States, the 
majority of Central American migrants do no have legal status;  46% of 
Salvadoran, 60% of Guatemalan, and 68% of Honduran migrants are 
undocumented.103  In addition to the post-conflict rise in migration, the labor 
migration flow has changed since the mid-1980s from single male migrants 
to an increased number of women migrants,104 of whom more than 90% 
work in the United States. 105   The continuation of migration after the 
conflicts and the changing demographic of the migration flow indicate new 
factors are influencing migration.  
 Increasing female labor migration can be traced to Central American 
economic policies, 106  as women migrants search for alternative income 
sources.  Since the mid-1980s, Central American countries have been in a 
process of economic liberalization. The Caribbean Basin Initiative in the 
mid-1980s supported liberal economic growth in Central America regions.107  
                                                      
98 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 9.  
99 MPI, supra note 34; MARC ROSENBLUM & KATE BRICK, US IMMIGRATION POLICY AND 
MEXICAN/CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION FLOWS: THEN AND NOW 2 (2011). 
100 Guatemala signed Peace Accords in 1996.  Cecilia Menjívar, Violence and Women’s Lives in 
Eastern Guatemala: A Conceptual Framework, 43 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 109, 128 (2008).  The conflict in 
El Salvador officially ended in 1992.  Cecilia Menjívar & Leisy J. Abrego, Legal Violence: Immigration 
Law and the Lives of Central American Immigrants, 117 AM. J. SOC.1380, 1392-93 (2012). 
101 ROSEMBLUM & BRICK, supra note 99, at 15.   
102 MPI, supra note 34. 
103 ROSENBLUM & BRICK, supra note 99, at 17. 
104 Id. at 14. 
105 Cortes Castellanos, supra note 16, at 36. 
106 Pessar, supra note 19, at 2.  See also Bill Ong Hing, NAFTA, Globalization, and Mexican 
Migrants, 5 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 87, 113-14 (2009) (workforce participation of women increased in 1980s 
and 1990s). 
107 Jasmine Gideon, Looking at Economies as Gendered Structures: An Application to Central 
America, 5 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 6 (1999). 
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The region also implemented structural adjustment policies108–Guatemala in 
1986, El Salvador in 1989, and Honduras and Nicaragua in 1990.109  These 
policies aimed to integrate Central American economies into the world 
market and create a smaller role for the state by opening markets to global 
and regional trade and cutting public expenditure and investment. 110  These 
changes coincided with a shift in Central America during the past twenty 
years from traditional agricultural exports to exporting labor.111  
 Structural adjustment and liberalization policies in Central America 
have had a disparate impact on women.112  The policies resulted in reduced 
wages and increased unemployment, while encouraging growth of low-pay, 
low-status processing and packing jobs held by women.113  They intensified 
gender inequities already present, including the undervaluing of women’s 
work as they consistently work longer hours than men without compensatory 
pay. 114  The economic reforms also adversely affected small-scale 
agricultural producers, especially women, in part because they have less 
access to credit and storage facilities than men. 115  These changes increased 
poverty levels and forced households to “look for new means of survival; in 
many cases . . . looking for alternative income-generating activates.”116  
More recently, studies indicate that the forced liberalization of the 
agricultural sector by the Central American Free Trade Agreement 
                                                      
108 Structural Adjustment Programs are neoliberal economic policies promoted by the World Bank 
(WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), often as conditions for receiving loans to service 
national debt.  World Health Organization (WHO), Structural Adjustment Programmes, http://www.who.in
t/trade/glossary/story084/en/index.html (last accessed Feb. 2, 2013).   
109 Gideon, supra note 107, at 12-13.  El Salvador continued structural adjustment economic reforms 
with IMF and WB loans in the early 1990s.  Chris van der Borgh, The Politics of Neoliberalism in Postwar 
El Salvador, 30 INT’L J. POL. ECON., 36, 43 (2000).  Guatemala perpetuated neoliberal economic models 
with the negotiated Peace Accords in 1996.  Linda Green, The Fear of No Future: Guatemalan Migrants, 
Dispossession and Dislocation, 51 ANTHROPOLOGICA 327, 329-30 (2009).   
110 Gideon, supra note 107, at 13. 
111 Manuel Orozco, Globalization and Migration: The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin 
America, 44 LAT. AM. POL. & SOC’Y. 41, 44 (2002).   
112 The greater adverse effect on women of trade policies and structural adjustment is widely 
recognized.  See, e.g., LOURDES BENERÍA, GENDER, DEVELOPMENT, AND GLOBALIZATION 49-53 (2003) 
(reviewing scholarship documenting how the burdens of adjustment have not been gender neutral); Gunseli 
Berik, Gender Aspects of Trade, in TRADE AND EMPLOYMENT: FROM MYTHS TO FACTS 171, 172 (ILO, M. 
Jansen, R. Peters & J.M. Salazar Ziriniachs eds., 2011); Don Flynn & Eleonore Kofman, Women, Trade, 
and Migration, 12 GENDER & DEV. 66, 67 (2004); Pessar & Mahler, supra note 50, at 21 (surveying current 
scholarship on the issue). 
113 Gideon, supra note 107, at 13 & 16.   
114 Id. at 16-17.  
115 Id. at 16.   
116 Id. at 13.   
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(“CAFTA”) with the United States has exacerbated hunger and food 
insecurity and inequitably impacted Central American women.117   
Simultaneously, cuts in public expenditure on social services such as 
health care increase the effects of unemployment and lower wages on 
households. 118  The burden of filling these needs often falls on women, who 
carry the responsibility for family health care. 119   As these policies 
exacerbate poverty, unemployment, and inequity, women increasingly 
shoulder the burden of household survival in what one scholar calls the 
“feminization of survival.”120 
Structural adjustment and CAFTA in Central America fuel out-
migration for both men and women as households seek alternative income 
sources. 121   However, these policies particularly increase migration of 
women labor migrants due to the gendered impact of structural adjustment 
and trade liberalization policies. 122   The alternative income-generating 
activities sought by households often depend upon women:  survival 
strategies include emigration, informal work, employment in export-zones, 
and sex work.123  In Central America specifically, the effects of CAFTA–
growth of rural poverty and poor employment options for women in the 
export-oriented factories–have contributed to pressures on women to join the 
migration movement to the United States.124 
In addition to factors compelling women to leave their countries of 
origin, conditions in destination countries–namely the United States–provide 
incentive for international migration.  Central American migrants join a 
steady flow of Mexican migrants northward, a flow that increased after the 
economic liberalization of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
                                                      
117 Flynn & Kofman, supra note 112, at 67 (citing International Gender and Trade Network study 
results).  Though CAFTA’s more recent implementation provides fewer studies of its results, the parallel 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been recognized as resulting in job loss in Mexico 
and displacement of rural farms. See Hing, supra note 106, at 100-102 & 113-121; Jennifer Gordan, People 
Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1109, 1115 (2010).  For 
recognition of the disparate impact on women of NAFTA and similar trade liberalization policies, see 
Pessar, supra note 19, at 2; Sassen, supra note 19, at 504-06; Cortes Castellanos, supra note 16, at 43. 
118 Gideon, supra note 107, at 13, 19. 
119 Id. 
120 Sassen, supra note 19, at 504-506 & 511-12. 
121 Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 100, at 1392-93; Green, supra note 109, at 328-329.  Looking to 
the parallel results of NAFTA, see Hing, supra note 106, at 98-102; Gordan, supra 117, at 1115. 
122 Pessar, supra note 19, at 2; Sassen, supra note 19, at 504-06; Cortes Castellanos, supra note 16, at 
43. 
123 Pessar, supra note 19, at 2; Sassen, supra note 19, at 506, 512-20.  
124 Flynn & Koffman, supra note 112, at 67; see also Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 100, at 1392-93.  
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(“NAFTA”). 125   In the United States and Canada, the search for higher 
profits by reducing labor costs has increased the demand for undocumented 
workers.126  Employers often hire undocumented workers because they will 
accept lower wages and more difficult working environments compared to 
United States citizens. 127   For migrant women, gender and race 
discrimination work together to make them employable in low-skilled, 
female-intensive labor industries such as service, healthcare, and apparel 
manufacturing,128 because employers assume they are “easier to manage.”129  
Women migrants also work in low-paying jobs in isolated and unregulated 
sectors of the economy.130  One such example is domestic workers; in North 
America the demand for international domestic workers has boomed and 
been filled by migrant workers.131  
 
2.  Diversification of Organized Crime and Corruption of Mexican State 
 Officials Creates Impunity for Sexual  and Gender-Based Violence 
 Against Women Migrants 
 
Criminal organizations are the primary perpetrators of sexual and 
gender-based violence of women migrants, facilitated by impunity for 
perpetrators and corrupt state officials.132  In the 1990s, reorganization of 
drug cartel operations in Mexico and Central America led to the 
diversification of criminal organizations’ from the drug trade into profit-
seeking activities including extortion, kidnapping, and human trafficking.133  
Migrant trafficking was a lucrative business in the 1990s, generating USD 
$3.5 billion per year in profits for organized criminal groups globally. 134  In 
Mexico, each migrant kidnapped brought in approximately USD $2,500 in 
ransom; thus, during the six-month period of the CNDH study, organized 
                                                      
125 Hing, supra note 106, at 94-95, 97; Raúl Delgado-Wise & Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, Migration and 
Development: Lessons from the Mexican Experience, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Feb. 2007), 
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=581; Williams, supra note 41, at 41. 
126 Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 39-40; Delgado-Wise & Guarnizo, supra note 125. 
127 Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 39-40. 
128 Pessar, supra note 19, at 3.  
129 Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 39-40. 
130 Margaret L. Satterhwaite, Crossing Border, Claiming Rights: Using Human Rights Law to 
Empower Women Migrant Workers, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L. J. 1, 7 (2005). 
131 Pessar, supra note 19, at 3. 
132 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 13. 
133 For a full analysis of this reorganization and its impact on migrants, see DUDLEY, supra note 78.  
The Mexican governments attack on drug trafficking has increased violence in the country and made the 
journey more dangerous for migrants.  See ALBA & CASTILLO, supra note 28, at 6.  
134 Sassen, supra note 19, at 517. 
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criminal groups brought in approximately USD $25 million from migrant 
kidnapping.135 
The CNDH study found that organized criminal groups committed 
94% of migrant kidnappings.136  Groups such as the Zetas and the Mexican 
Gulf Cartel actively prey on migrants, controlling coyotes or participating in 
smuggling themselves.137  Maras, transnational criminal groups originally 
formed by criminals deported from the United States to Central America, 
also purportedly have a prominent role in kidnapping and extorting 
migrants.138   
The entrance of Mexican cartels into smuggling and human 
trafficking dramatically increased the risk migrants face when they cross 
Central America and Mexico. 139   This correlates directly to the rise in 
violence against migrant women, especially along the borders and at transit 
points.140 In addition to smuggling, these groups also launch direct attacks 
on migrants, such as one kidnapping in August 2010 that resulted in the 
killing of 193 migrants. 141   Organized criminal groups also force many 
women into sexual exploitation and prostitution.142  The Zetas specifically 
have been connected to human trafficking in the Northern Triangle and 
Mexico. 143   
The complicity and cooperation of Mexican state officials with 
organized criminal groups aids criminal operations. Mexican authorities 
directly participated in at least ninety-one of the almost 10,000 kidnappings 
in the CNDH study; in another ninety-nine cases, migrants knew that their 
kidnappers interacted with police.144  In 2001, INM officials handed 120 
migrants over to the Gulf Cartel to be held for ransom. 145  Army personnel 
have also been connected to extortion and mass kidnapping. 146  Interviews 
of women in immigration detention in Mexico indicated that in a majority of 
physical or sexual violence cases, the perpetrator was an authority figure. 147  
                                                      
135 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 12. 
136 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 14. 
137 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 13. 
138 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 5-6.   
139 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 1.   
140 HRC, supra note 16, at ¶ 65. 
141 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 13.   
142 MEYER & BREWER, supra note 1, at 3.    
143 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 16.   
144 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 14 (56 of the 91 being police). 
145 DUDLEY, supra note 78, at 14.   
146 Id.   
147 Gabriela Diaz & Gretchen Kuhner, Women Migrants in Detention in Mexico: Conditions and Due 
Process, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (June 2008), available at http://www.migrationinformation.org/USFoc
us/display.cfm?ID=684.  This comment focuses on officials as perpetrators, but does not address abuses or 
human rights violations of women migrants while in immigration custody or detention.  Id. 
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Migrant women also reported being sexually abused by migration authorities 
in exchange for not being detained.148  
Perpetration of extreme abuses against migrants is encouraged by 
impunity for perpetrators, exacerbated by a weak judiciary and inefficient 
police force. 149   Criminal gangs operate without fear of punishment, 
frequently abducting more than 100 migrants at a time, often in plain view 
of state officials. 150   While the Mexican government registered 141 
kidnapping cases from January 2008 to April 2010, courts sentenced only 
two people for a crime related to the activity. 151  The CNDH recognized 
impunity and the deterioration of the rule of law as a “fundamental incentive 
for the increased kidnapping.”152 
The perpetration of abuses by criminal gangs is aided by the 
corruption and complicity of state agents, as well as the impunity for actors 
in both groups.  The effect of the relationship between organized crime and 
government on migrant abuse was articulated in 2008 by the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants. 153  He concluded that because 
of “the pervasiveness of corruption at all levels of government and the close 
relationship that many authorities have with gang networks, incidences of 
extortion, rape, and assault of migrants continue.”154  Thus, stopping the 
perpetrators of violence requires targeting a complex web of corruption 
between state actors and organized crime.  
 
III.   THE ROLE OF MIGRATION LAW IN CREATING MIGRATION PATTERNS 
THAT INCREASE THE RISK OF SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE   
 
Considering women’s experience in the process of migration reveals 
that economic liberalization propels female labor migration.  Criminal 
organizations and complicit state officials prey upon these migrants, 
perpetrating gender-based violence, including kidnapping, trafficking, sexual 
assault, and rape.  Underlying these factors, the migration law regime creates 
the conditions that push women labor migrants into the illicit migration 
channels that make them vulnerable to the exploitation and abuse of criminal 
organizations and corrupt officials.  
 
                                                      
148  Id.  
149  Steven Elías Alvarado & Douglas S. Massey, In Search of Peace: Structural Adjustment, 
Violence, and International Migration, 630 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 137, 138 (2010).  
150 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 11.  
151 Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1, at 7. 
152 CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 29, 32. 
153 HRC, supra note 16, ¶ 65. 
154 Id. 
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A. Restrictive Immigration Policies of the LGP Exacerbated Women’s 
Vulnerability to Abuse 
 
Restrictive immigration policies increase the vulnerability of women 
migrants’ position in two ways.155  First, restrictive immigration policies 
push migrants into illicit migration channels that make them vulnerable to 
attack by organized criminal groups.156  To avoid risks of detention, female 
migrants rely more on intermediary smugglers, exposing them to greater 
threats of forced prostitution and human trafficking.157  Second, the law 
treats women with irregular status as violators of the law, creating a barrier 
to criminal accountability and access to services.158  The following sections 
consider how the former Mexican migration regime under the LGP created 
conditions of vulnerability for women migrants. 
 
1.   Inaccessible Legal Status and Punitive Enforcement Against Irregular 
Migrants Under the LGP Pushed Women Migrants Into Dangerous 
Migration Channels 
  
Immigration enforcement mechanisms used prior to the migration law 
reform under the LGP put women migrants in situations vulnerable to sexual 
and gender-based violence.  Prior to the effectuation of the Migration Law in 
November of 2012, the LGP governed the rights of migrants in transit 
through Mexico.159  In the early 1990s, as the region prepared for greater 
integration under NAFTA, the United States and Canada pressured Mexico 
to restrict irregular Central American migrants who joined the flow of 
Mexican migrants northward.160  In response, Mexico increased sanctions 
under the LGP for irregular entry into Mexico.161  They also required Central 
Americans transmigrants seeking a transit visa, available under the LGP, to 
demonstrate they had a valid visa to enter their final destination, the United 
States. 162  This made transit visas effectively inaccessible. 163   Instead of 
stemming the flow of migrants northward, the policy forced Central 
American migrants to enter and traverse Mexico through irregular channels 
and more frequently rely on smugglers to guide their journey and avoid 
                                                      
155 Sassen, supra note 19, at 517-18. 
156 ILO Guide, supra note 51, at 17; Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 46. 
157 ILO Guide, supra note 51, at 17; Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 41. 
158 See supra note 157. 
159 LGP; LM. 
160 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 5. 
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162 Id.; RLGP 2000 art. 161; Ruiz, supra note 29, at 50. 
163 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 5. 
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detection.164  The lack of legal channels of migration for migrants under the 
LGP forced migrants into routes in isolated areas and noncommercial 
transportation, both susceptible to attack by criminal groups.165   
The pressure on irregular migrants to move “underground” grew as 
enforcement efforts to detain and deport irregular migrants increased in the 
last two decades.  In 2000, the Instituto Nacional de Migración, or National 
Immigration Institute (“INM”), was created to implement migration policy, 
including the administration and enforcement of the LGP. 166  Since the 
INM’s inception in 2000 until 2011, INM detention centers have doubled 
and their total budget grew by two-thirds. 167   Between 2000 and 2006, 
detentions increased from 151,000 to 183,000168 (though decreased again 
after 2006 due to shrinking migration flows resulting from the economic 
recession in the United States, increasing harshness of migration policy, and 
the increase in violence against migrants).169   
The INM implemented migration checkpoints throughout the country, 
further motivating migrants to travel in more isolated areas and making them 
more vulnerable to criminal activity. 170  Although significant procedural 
requirements of the LGP and its regulations purportedly limited the ability of 
the INM to conduct migration checks away from established checkpoints, 
curbing INM’s enforcement power, 171  human rights organizations say 
officials routinely ignored these regulations.172  The IOM found that the 
increase and diversification of migration flows and routes through Mexico 
due to enforcement coincided with greater risks and vulnerabilities of the 
migrant population to trafficking.173 
 The participation of non-immigration officials in immigration 
enforcement activities with the INM further proliferates the abuse of women 
migrants by involving potentially complicit and corrupt state actors.  Under 
the LGP, the INM received assistance from the Federal Police in 
                                                      
164 Id. 
165 Although this comment is limited to a discussion of Mexico’s migration policies, the migration 
policies of the ultimate destination country, the United States, ultimately reach beyond the Mexico-United 
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discussion of these restrictive policies and their effect on Central American migrant, see Menjívar & 
Abrego, supra note 100, at 1397-99 (2012); ROSENBLUM & BRICK, supra note 99. 
166 LGP art. 16; RLGP art. 133-36. 
167 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 6. 
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169 IMUMI, supra note 45, at 12. 
170 MEYER & BREWER, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
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172 AMNESTY 2010, supra note 16, at 22-23.  
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enforcement activities.174  The INM could also request support from federal, 
local, or municipal public security agents to enforce migration law.175  In 
2001, Mexico implemented Plan Sur, a program supported by the United 
States, to limit undocumented migration across the southern border by 
including federal, state, and municipal police, as well as the Mexican Army 
and Navy, in immigration enforcement efforts with the INM. 176   Civil 
society groups criticized the program because, by involving state agents in 
migration control, it increased opportunities for officials complicit with 
organized criminal groups to abuse migrants.177  Furthermore, participation 
of law enforcement contributes to impunity, as it is “virtually impossible” 
for a migrant to identify which of the 300-plus police forces committed an 
abuse in order to hold them accountable.178   
 The lack of legal migration channels, increased enforcement of 
migration law within Mexican territory, and the participation of non-
immigration officials in immigration enforcement all contributed to push 
migrants underground into migration channels more vulnerable to attack by 
organized criminal groups.  The CNDH blamed this combination of factors–
unauthorized migration checks by non-immigration agent–for creating a 
climate that permits the continued sexual assault, robbery, and extortion of 
migrants.179 
 
2.   LGP Provisions Created Barriers to Reporting the Abuse of Women 
Migrants and Holding Perpetrators Accountable  
 
Not only did the LGP enforcement mechanism push migrants into 
dangerous migration channels, its provisions also created substantial barriers 
to reporting abuses of women migrants once they did occur.  Article 67 
obligated federal, local, and municipal state officials to demand proof of 
legal status from all foreigners who sought their services 180  and report 
foreigners without legal status.181  This deterred migrants wishing to report 
an abuse, as the law required the official receiving their report to turn them 
                                                      
174 LGP art. 16; RLGP art. 133-36. 
175 LGP 73; RLGP 98. 
176 IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2003, supra note 38, at ¶181-184; Ruiz, supra note 29, at 50.   
177 IACHR RAPPORTEUR 2003, supra note 38, at ¶ 181-184 
178 Diaz & Kuhner, supra note 20. 
179 Comisión Nacional de Derecho Humanos de México (CNDH), Recomendación General No. 
13/2006: SOBRE LA PRÁCTICA DE VERIFICACIONES MIGRATORIAS ILEGALES [GENERAL RECOMMENDATION 
NO. 13/2006: ON THE PRACTICE OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS] 9 (2006), available at 
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over to immigration authorities.182  It also created a disincentive for officials 
to receive or investigate a report, as the complaining party would be handed 
over to INM, deported, and no longer be available to assist in the 
investigation.183   
Unsurprisingly, this created an environment where women migrants 
rarely reported sexual abuse.184  Women were afraid to come forward to civil 
or state authorities, likely because these players often perpetrated or 
facilitated the abuses.185  Migrants also faced the risk of deportation if they 
reported and thus the loss of their chance to reach the United States,186 risks 
many women were unwilling to take given the necessity of economically 
supporting their families through migration.187  The INM previously made 
no effort to gather information or screen for abuses when detaining migrant 
women, nor was there a mechanism by which detained women could report 
abuses or receive adequate psychological or medical treatment.188  
 In rare cases when migrants did overcome the barriers created by 
Article 67 and reported abuses by criminal gangs or state officials, the state 
still rarely held perpetrators accountable.  Officials often refused to register 
migrant’s complaints, or did not move the complaint forward.189  Authorities 
often failed to investigate or inadequately investigated reports of abuses, 
contributing to impunity.190  Few, if any, investigative actions have been 
taken against officials alleged to have directly participated or colluded with 
criminal gangs in the abuse or kidnapping of migrants.191  While convictions 
for human trafficking increased in 2011, the involvement of public officials 
still receives little investigation.192   The corruption of officials contributed 
to impunity, as did the law’s treatment of migrants as violators, not victims. 
 
B.  Mexico’s Migration Law Reforms Culminated in the Migration Law 
 
Mexico recognized their migration policy played a role in the 
vulnerability of migrants to abuse.  Since the early 2000s, it has made 
                                                      
182 AMNESTY 2010, supra note 16, at 29; CNDH 2009, supra note 23, at 27. 
183 See supra note 182. 
184 CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 7 (migrants often don’t report because want to reach their final 
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186 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 16.   
187 Kuhner, supra note 20, at 25.   
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189 Id. at 27. 
190 Id. at 15. 
191 Id. at 14.. 
192 UNITED STATES DEPT. OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2012 248, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192596.pdf. 
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significant efforts to amend migration policies under the LGP.  These 
reforms included the 2008 reform of the LGP to abrogate prison terms for 
irregular migrant workers, the adoption of an anti-trafficking law, 
improvements to migrant detention centers, and a migrant regularization 
program, among others.193  Despite these efforts, high rates of kidnapping, 
extortion, cruelty, disappearances, and killing of migrants by criminal groups 
and state authorities continued, indicating the insufficiency of these reforms 
to change the patterns underlying the abuses.194  
The need for deeper reform of their migration policy came to the front 
of the political agenda when growing international attention on the abuses of 
migrants in Mexico 195  compromised Mexico’s foreign policy agenda to 
protect their migrant citizens abroad.196  The discovery in August 2010 of 72 
bodies of Mexican, Central American, and South American migrants who 
had been massacred by criminal organizations in San Fernando, 
Taumalipas, 197  ignited pressure for reform and facilitated the quick and 
unanimous passage of the migration reform law in May of 2011.198 
The Migration Law repealed Mexico’s former migration policy in the 
LGP.199  The new Migration Law sets forth the rights and responsibilities for 
non-citizen immigrants, migrants in transit, and emigrants returning to 
Mexico.200  Mexico issued regulations for the law on September 24, 2012 
(the Reglamento de la Ley de Migración (RLM)); the law went into effect in 
November 2012.201    
Mexico’s Migration Law does follow recommendations of 
international bodies to recognize gender and the need for protection of 
women. 202  A guiding principle of the law provides for “unrestricted respect 
                                                      
193 Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families (CPRMW), Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 74 of the 
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Rights, March 22, 2010, the Amnesty International Report in 2010, and the sixth report on the situation of 
human rights of migrant by civil society groups.  CNDH 2011, supra note 14, at 32-38. 
196 Ruiz, supra note 29, at 51.  
197 Morning Edition: Migrant Massacre; Drug Cartel Suspected in 72 Migrants Deaths, National 
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for the human rights of migrants, nationals, and foreigners, regardless of 
their origin, nationality, gender, ethnicity, age, and migration situation, with 
special attention to vulnerable groups such as minors, women, indigenous, 
adolescents and elderly persons, and victims of crime.”203  Media and some 
international human rights institutions commended Mexico for this 
progressive and modern approach, 204 which, according to Mexican officials, 
puts them at the vanguard of international migration policy.205  
The overt recognition of women and gender draws attention to the 
feminization of migration and special needs of women migrants.  However, 
it does not guarantee that the structures created by the law adequately 
respond to the unique situations of women migrants, nor that the law will 
prevent harm to women migrants.  Human rights institutions and scholars 
have criticized the regime and its continued reliance on traditional migration 
enforcement mechanisms as contravening international human rights 
standards and the Mexican Constitution. 206   The following sections will 
examine the Migration Law through a gender lens to evaluate its effect on 
the risk of sexual and gender-based violence facing women labor migrants 
during transit through Mexico.  
IV. MEXICO’S MIGRATION LAW: SOARING RHETORIC RECOGNIZES GENDER 
BUT ULTIMATELY FAILS TO MITIGATE OR PREVENT THE ACTUAL 
VULNERABILITY OF WOMEN MIGRANTS TO ABUSES 
Women migrants are increasingly pushed to migrate in response to 
economic liberalization, but due to organized criminal groups and corrupt 
officials face high levels of gender-based violence during migration.207  Prior 
to the migration law, women migrants were made more vulnerable to abuse 
by the restrictive policies of the LGP.208  This section takes up the new 
Migration Law to consider whether it will reduce the vulnerability created 
by migration policy.  Though the recent effectuation of the law does not 
provide experiences of its application, the following sections consider the 
probable capacity of the law to change the dangerous patterns of women’s 
                                                      
203 LM art. 2. 
204 See Luis Gabriela Morales Vega, Categorías Migratorias en México. Análisis a la Ley de 
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labor migration perpetuated by the LGP.  This comment concludes that the 
Migration Law, though addressing the political progress of the law’s 
language, ultimately fails to create structures that would change the 
vulnerable position of women migrants. 
 
A. The Migration Law’s Rhetoric Acknowledges Women Migrants as a 
Vulnerable Group without Addressing Causes of Vulnerability 
 
 The Migration Law’s recognition of gender consists predominantly in 
identifying women migrants as a particular group of vulnerable migrants 
with special needs.  In Article 2, the first governing principle of the law 
provides for the protection of migrants’ human rights, regardless of 
migration status.209   The provision gives “special attention to vulnerable 
groups such as minors, women, indigenous peoples, adolescents and seniors, 
and victims of crime.”210  In addition, Article 73, addressing the protection 
of migrants in transit through Mexico’s territory, requires giving adequate 
attention to migrants in situations of vulnerability, including unaccompanied 
minors, women, victims of crime, disabled persons, and the elderly.211    
The Migration Law also recognizes the vulnerability of women in 
regards to particular enforcement activities. Migration proceedings will 
include questionnaires designed to determine if attention to vulnerable 
migrants, including women and victims of crime, meets their needs and 
respects their human rights.212  During “assisted return,” the “voluntary” 
option to be returned to one’s country of origin when apprehended with 
irregular status, the INM must allow pregnant women and victims or 
witnesses of serious crimes to stay in an institution that will provide the 
attention they require.213  Other provisions of the Migration Law provide 
adequate nutrition and extra protections for pregnant and lactating women 
during detention or assisted return.214  
 The recognition of women as a vulnerable category of migrant, while 
providing important services in some circumstances, does not actually 
change the experience of women migrants.  By consistently categorizing 
women as vulnerable, the law does not acknowledge that economic policy, 
criminal impunity, and restrictive immigration policy create women’s 
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vulnerability by pushing them into high-risk migration patterns. 215   By 
recognizing the vulnerability of women migrants in the law, Mexico has 
begun to acknowledge gender-distinct experiences of migration.  However, 
the recognition of vulnerability cannot prevent nor sufficiently mitigate such 
vulnerability; to the contrary, it can entrench or assume categories of 
vulnerability without question as to their origin. 
 One provision of the Migration Law could provide a limited opening 
for a more nuanced recognition of women migrants.  The law creates a 
partnership with the Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres, or National Women’s 
Institute (Inmujer). 216   Inmujer must coordinate with INM to address 
problems of women migrants, ensure compliance with international 
conventions and treaties, promote action to improve social conditions of 
female migrants and eradicate discrimination, and provide training to INM 
officials on gender equality and the human rights of migrants.217  Inmujer’s 
training of INM officials will include perspectives of gender and attention to 
vulnerable groups in migration flows. 218   Providing gender training to 
immigration officials could create positive changes for women by improving 
protection of women migrants and responses to victims.219  Civil society 
groups watching for the impact of the Migration Law on women migrants 
recommended these trainings.220  However, the goal of the training continues 
to couch the experience of women migrants in terms of their vulnerability 
and need for special attention, rather than dismantling conditions that 
actually create vulnerability. 
B.   Mexico’s Migration Law Misses Opportunities to Reduce the 
 Vulnerable Conditions of Female Migration Created by Migration 
 Policy 
 Despite the Migration Law’s recognition of women as a particular 
category of vulnerable migrant, the law fails to create structures that would 
mitigate the vulnerability created by migration policies or address the forces 
driving migration and abuse.  The Migration Law’s failure to provide regular 
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status to labor migrants in transit, continued reliance on restrictive and 
punitive immigration enforcement mechanisms, and the unchanged power of 
the INM and participation of other state officials in immigration 
enforcement continue to leave women vulnerable to sexual and gender-based 
violence. 
1. Lack of Regular Status for Migrants in Transit Fails to Respond to the 
Feminization of Migration or Remove Barriers to Safer Migration 
Patterns 
 The Migration Law does not provide regular status to migrants 
transiting Mexico, failing to respond to the feminization of migration and 
remove the primary barrier to safer migration patterns.  The law did change 
the visa categories for foreigners entering Mexico under Article 52, perhaps 
one of the most visible changes created by the law. 221   None of these 
categories provide a visa status for a migrant in transit to another country, 
unless they can demonstrate economic solvency–unlikely given the 
economic motivations of most irregular migrants.  “Visitante Regional,” or 
“regional visitor” status, allows foreign nationals of neighboring countries to 
enter Mexico’s frontier region, but only for up to three days.222  “Visitante 
sin permiso para realizar actividades remuneradas” provides visitor status for 
up to 180 days without permission to work.223  Applicants must demonstrate 
one of several factors, including motivation for their return to their home 
country, economic solvency, an invitation from an institution for an event or 
study, or a family relationship with a visa holder.224  These requirements 
effectively preclude women labor migrants from utilizing these visas. 
 For the small number of Central American women migrants 
destined for Mexico, the employment-based visas do little to reach low-
skilled women labor migrants or protect them from labor exploitation.  
“Vistante trabajador fronterizo,” or “Frontier work visitor,” authorizes a 
foreign national of a bordering country to stay up to a year in certain 
location with a work permit based on an offer of employment.225  “Visitante 
con permiso para realizar actividades remunderadas” allows a visitor to 
work at the invitation of certain types of employers.226  Because women tend 
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to work in informal sectors, often with more than one employer and high 
turnover, these schemes do not provide a likely alternative for irregular 
women migrants destined for Mexico, and would maintain their 
vulnerability by making their entry status dependent on a single employer.227  
This scheme fails to respond to the reality of female labor migration in the 
region.   
 The only provision of the law providing possible status for women 
migrants without economic means is a visa for victims or witnesses of a 
crime.228  If migration authorities detain a migrant and find indications she 
may be a crime victim, they must conduct an interview of the migrant.229  
This interview should address the person’s background, means for arriving 
from their country of origin, and physical and emotional health.230  The law 
provides no further details on the process of victim detection, creating the 
potential that authorities will miss victims during screening, or re-traumatize 
victims by discussing the abuse in inappropriate ways or without proper 
support.  A victim without status can then participate in a criminal 
proceeding and have the opportunity to regularize their migration situation 
after the criminal process concludes. 231   While intended to encourage 
reporting of crimes, this structure leaves victims vulnerable throughout the 
criminal proceedings by not granting status until the completion of criminal 
proceedings.  Given the track record of prosecutions for crimes against 
migrants, this does not provide a clear safety net for victims. Furthermore, 
while this provides some important protection in light of the current barriers 
to reporting abuse, it ultimately perpetuates women as presupposed victims 
of abuse by predicating immigration status on victimhood versus aiming to 
end victimhood.    
The lack of legal migration options available through the Migration 
Laws perpetuates the vulnerability engendered by the LGP policies, 
continuing to push migrants to travel in more isolated routes and depend on 
smugglers.232  Mexico initially considered granting visitor visas to migrants 
in transit in order to allow them greater access to judicial and legal 
protection. 233  Mexico left this provision out of the migration law234 and 
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missed a significant opportunity to shift the balance towards migrants.235  
The provision would likely have encountered opposition from the United 
States and Canada, as it would have reduced barriers to migrants moving 
north without a visa to enter either nation. 236  
In addition to pushing migrants into dangerous migration channels, 
the failure to provide regular status to labor migrants in transit ignores the 
economic conditions that drive women to choose a risky migration in search 
of income.  The law purports to reflect this goal, stating in its guiding 
principles a commitment to operate complementarily to national labor 
markets in the region for the adequate management of labor migration in 
keeping with national necessities. 237   However, the law does not create 
structures of visas or regular status that would endorse migration patterns 
that respond to labor needs in the region’s countries.  Thus, the law utterly 
fails to account for the reality of the feminization of migration and the 
growing number of women migrating as laborers. 
 
2.   INM’s Continued Unchecked Power Fails to Reduce Corruption and 
Complicity with Criminal Organizations who Abuse Migrant Women  
  
 While the Migration Law dramatically changes the Mexican 
government’s articulated migration policy priorities, it largely maintains the 
current institutional migration management structure and thus it does not 
address the rampant corruption and complicity of immigration and state 
officials in migrant abuse.  The INM retains most policy, enforcement, and 
administrative responsibilities.238   The institution remains responsible for 
enforcement of the laws, including immigration status checks, detention, 
deportation, administration and adjudication of immigration status 
determinations, while also charged with protecting the human rights of 
migrants. 239   The law does contain provisions to sanction immigration 
officials who share confidential information, impede the normal transit of 
migration affairs, violate the human rights of migrants,240 or deny a migrant 
the rights and services provided in the law.241  However, these provisions 
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lack sufficient power to stem historic corruption, as it makes INM 
responsible for its own self-regulation and imposition of sanctions.242  
 Furthermore, the law fails to adequately protect migrants from the 
power of other corrupt officials who facilitate abuses.243  INM can continue 
to request assistance from non-immigration state officials during migration 
enforcement actions. 244   In migration control actions, such as reviewing 
documents of those attempting to enter or exit the country, Article 81 of the 
Migration Law allows the Federal Police to act in support and coordination 
with the INM at the INM’s request.245  The final version of the Migration 
Law provides for more limited involvement of Federal Police than earlier 
proposals; media reports indicate that at the last minute legislators 
eliminated Article 26, a measure that would have charged the Federal Police 
with the same immigration law enforcement power as that of immigration 
officials.246   
 While the final form of the law reduces the power state officials might 
have been able to legally assert over migrants, the INM can still request 
assistance from the Federal Police or other state officials under certain 
circumstances and procedures.247  Given the rate of involvement of INM and 
other officials in the abuse of migrants, and the sexual abuse and rape that 
occurs during stops of migrants in transit, 248  this allowance for police 
involvement perpetuates the risks of complicity of officials with criminal 
organizations.  This also furthers impunity due to the inability to track or 
identify officials responsible for abuses or corruption.249   
While the law’s guiding principles state a commitment to “combat 
organized crime, especially . . . trafficking and kidnapping of migrants,” 250 it 
fails to change the institutional structure in a way that can stop patterns of 
corruption that facilitate abuses.  The lack of accountability of the INM and 
the continued ability of non-immigration officials to participate in 
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249 See supra Part II.B.2. 
250 LM art. 2. 
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immigration enforcement efforts does not limit the ability of corrupt officials 
to access migrants or facilitate abuse. 
 
 
3. Restrictive and Punitive Immigration Enforcement Continues to Push 
 Women Migrants into Migration Channels that Increase Vulnerability 
 to Abuses 
 
 The Migration Law, while articulating protection for the human rights 
of migrants, continues to rely on a restrictive and punitive enforcement 
system that will maintain dangerous irregular migration channels and 
migrants’ dependence on smugglers.  The INM may still conduct migration 
control away from international points of entry and exit with roadblocks, 
patrols, or migration “filters” away from the country’s borders.251  The law’s 
continued reliance on punitive enforcement forces women to choose hidden 
and illicit migration channels.  The Migration Law also maintains the 
detention system (euphemistically called “aseguramiento,” or “securement”) 
as the principle means of enforcement.252  “Presentación,” or detention in 
migration stations, remains the measure used to temporarily lodge a 
foreigner who cannot prove their status or be returned.253  Foreigners are 
subject to deportation if they enter the country without the required 
documents, enter in a place not authorized for entry, reenter after deportation 
without entry agreement, or provide false information or documentation.254
 While these restrictive policies and enforcement mechanisms will 
serve to push irregular women migrants further underground, the law also 
fails to provide an alternative to traditional immigration enforcement 
structures.  By failing to utilize a new approach to immigration policy, 
Mexico belies its leadership role in migration solutions for the region.  The 
law’s guiding principles state that it will protect the human rights of 
migrants and facilitate the international mobility of people in recognition of 
the contribution of migrants to the origin and destination societies.255  The 
continued use of internal migration checkpoints and detention as primary 
                                                      
251 LM art. 81 & 97; see also JOSÉ ANTONIO GUEVARA BERMÚDEZ, INSTITUTO DE ESUDIOS Y 
DIVULGACION SOBRE MIGRACIÓN, INSTUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
MIGRATION IN MEXICO 197-201 (Fabienne Venet Rebiffé, ed. 2011), available at 
http://imprasc.net:29572/DocumentosyPub/Paginas/Inicio.aspx. 
252 Grupo de Trabajo supra note 206, at 28. 
253 LM art. 99.  Human rights institutions and scholars criticize this deportation system as a violation 
of international human rights standards and the Mexican Constitution because it infringes upon a person’s 
liberty and freedom of movement.  Grupo de Trabajo, supra note 206, at 28; IACHR Rapporteur 2011, 
supra note 24, at 3. 
254 LM art. 144. 
255 LM art. 2. 
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enforcement mechanisms to curb migration does little to change the previous 
migration regime other than providing INM a legal mandate to consider and 
protect the human rights of migrants.  The structures created by the 
Migration Law do not reflect a state commitment to freedom of movement 
of women migrants or assurance of safe migration channels void of sexual 
and gender-based violence. 
V. PROPOSALS FOR DECREASING VULNERABILITY OF WOMEN MIGRANTS 
THROUGH MEXICO’S MIGRATION LAW AND REGIONAL POLICY 
The shortcomings of Mexico’s migration law reform point to the 
critical need for Mexico’s domestic migration policy to create structures that 
reduce the conditions of vulnerability for women migrants in transit. 
Ultimately, however, understanding of the role of economic liberalization in 
propelling women’s migration reveals that preventing abuses of women 
migrants requires a region-wide migration policy that reflects the gendered 
socioeconomic reality of northward labor migration.  To reach a migration 
policy that reflects the economically-driven flows, a first critical step 
requires the Mexican government to create a legal migration channel for 
migrants transiting Mexican territory.  Beyond Mexico’s policies, preventing 
sexual violence and trafficking requires options for legal channels of 
migration to the destination country, namely the United States, that account 
for the gendered factors influencing migration. 
 
A.  Providing a Legal Migration Channel to Transmigrants Will Reduce 
Women Migrants’ Reliance on Migration Channels that Heighten the 
Risk of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence 
 
Mexico’s most significant unilateral policy tool to mitigate the 
vulnerable position of women migrants is the provision of a regular 
migration channel to transmigrants.  The ILO advocates for more legal and 
regular migration channels based on the needs of the labor market as a key 
element of protecting women migrants.256  State and federal authorities, civil 
society groups, and human rights institutions acknowledge regularization as 
a way to ease migrants’ fear of detention, making it easier for migrants to 
file complaints against perpetrators of abuses and move freely through 
Mexican territory. 257   Providing legal status would reduce the need for 
interior migration checkpoints that have been the site of kidnappings258 and 
                                                      
256 Fontes Chammartin, supra note 17, at 47. 
257 IACHR Rapporteur 2011, supra note 24, at 11-12.   
258 Amnesty 2010, supra note 16, at 22-23.   
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allow migrants to travel freely, avoiding isolated routes that increase 
susceptibility to criminal activities. 259   This would allow migrants the 
opportunity to travel directly to the northern border via commercialized 
transportation. 
According to some reports, the INM considered giving transmigrants 
visitor visa status as a way to ensure their greater access to legal 
protection 260  The Migration Law provides a framework of existing 
categories that could be expanded to provide migrants in transit with a 
visitor visa during transit.261  This approach should require the visas be 
available at the border, not only at consular offices as required for other 
types of visas.262  However, providing special status to transmigrants is not a 
politically viable option for Mexico, given the historic pressure from the 
United States that Mexico effectuate its preferred migration policy.263  It 
would furthermore require an administrative process that could effectively 
limit access to a transit visa. 
Another method of providing legal status to migrants in Mexico is to 
build upon regional cooperative approaches to migration policy.264  In 2002 
and 2005, as part of efforts to increase regional integration under the Sistema 
de Integración Centroamericano, or Central American Integration System 
(“SICA”) Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua ratified an 
agreement known as CA-4.  The agreement permits nationals of a country to 
move throughout the other three nations with only an identification 
document. 265   Individuals can have intraregional mobility for up to six 
months but are not authorized to conduct remunerated activities.266  In 2004, 
Mexico joined SICA as a regional observer state, its participation thus far 
focused on organized criminal activities rather than migration.267  However, 
other cooperative efforts to address issues regionally with Mexico and 
Central America 268  indicate the viability of Mexico joining the CA-4 
                                                      
259 Meyer & Brewer, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
260 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 16; see also supra Part III, Sec. C.1. 
261 LM art. 52; see also supra Part III, C.1. 
262 See RLM art. 102. 
263 See supra Part III. A. 
264 These alternative methods of achieving legal migration challenges are currently being discussed 
by civil society groups in Mexico.  Many thanks to Gretchen Kuhner for pointing my attention to these 
much more viable approaches. 
265 Alba & Castillo, supra note 28, at 12. 
266 Id. 
267 Id.  
268 Efforts such as the Regional Conference on Migration, an intergovernmental forum including 
Mexico, Central American and North American nations to promote cooperation on migration issues, as 
well as the Plan Puebla-Panama (now the Mesoamerican Initiative) to promote regional development point 
to the ability and need for Mexican-Central American collaboration.  Id. at 12-13. 
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agreement.  This would allow Guatemalans, El Salvadorans, Hondurans, and 
Nicaraguans to enter and move freely in Mexico without an additional visa. 
Alternatively, Mexico could simply suppress the visa requirement for 
nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua.269  Currently, 
Mexico does not require visas for the Central American nations of Costa 
Rica, Panama, and Belize.270  These citizens may request to enter Mexico as 
a “visitor without permission to conduct remunerated activities” by 
presenting their passport or identification upon entry. 271  They can be asked 
to demonstrate the reason for their visit, but there is no required showing.272 
Citizens of those nations from which Mexico does require a visa must 
request a visa for a “visitor without permission to conduct remunerated 
activities” at a Mexican consulate. 273  Mexico has suppressed visa 
requirements in the past, including for nationals of Colombia as of 
November 9, 2012, who may now enter Mexico as a visitor for 180 days just 
upon showing their Colombian passport.274  Article 18 of the Migration Law 
gives the Secretary of Governance the authority necessary to make such a 
decision, directing it to formulate and direct migration policy, formulate the 
requirements and procedures for providing visas, and to establish or suppress 
requirements for the entry of foreigners to Mexico.275 
Mexico’s provision of regular status to transmigrants cannot prevent 
all dangers to women.  Ultimately, criminal organizations prey on traveling 
migrants regardless of status; providing status serves merely as a means to 
change the migration patterns of migrants to avoid locations and methods of 
travel susceptible to attack.  Furthermore, even with regularized status in 
Mexico, the inability to legally cross the northern border could still push 
women migrants into these same vulnerable channels of migration and 
dependence on smugglers.  Mexico’s limited capacity to impact the flow of 
labor migration in light of the paucity of legal and regular migration 
channels to the United States makes it impossible for Mexico to unilaterally 
prevent migrants from relying on illicit migration channels.  However, the 
                                                      
269 See Secretaria de Gobernación (SEGOB), Países y Regiones que Requieren Visa para Viajar a 
México INSTITUTE NACIONAL DE MIGRACIÓN http://www.inm.gob.mx/index.php/page/Paises_Visa (last 
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provision of regular channels through Mexico is an important step that 
would reduce vulnerability by decreasing the time migrants must spend in 
illicit channels and dependent on smugglers.   
B. Preventing Abuse Requires an Integrated Regional Response to 
Economic and Social Realities 
Ultimately, the prevention of abuse of women migrants requires that 
sending, receiving, and transit nations in the region develop a cooperative 
migration regime that reflects female labor migration flows created by 
existing economic conditions.  As discussed in Part II, regional economic 
liberalization and trade agreements with the United States, as well as the 
demand for labor in the United States, propel female migration.  As the 
primary destination country for migration, the United States is clearly an 
important player in this regional approach and occupies a powerful position 
in the migration regime due to its labor needs and restrictive policies.276  
However, sending and transit nations must also provide for the movement of 
people required by the region’s economic relationships, such as that 
provided by the CA-4.  Because a migrant’s choices are affected by the 
migration policies along her entire route and in the destination country, 
changing migration patterns to prevent abuses requires changes region-wide. 
Civil society organizations advocating for migrants in Mexico since 
the 1980s 277  have urged countries of the region to adopt a regional, 
interdisciplinary perspective on migration policy.278  This perspective should 
consider the asymmetrical relationships between sending and receiving 
countries, 279  recognizing the power differential between the respective 
abilities of the United States and Central American nations to shape 
migration flows.  These solutions should include social and economic policy, 
rather than approaching migration as a national security issue.280  
A regional and interdisciplinary approach to migration policy in order 
to prevent the abuse of women transmigrants should start by recognizing the 
patterns created by the feminization of migration. One such solution, 
developed by Professor Jennifer Gordon, would accommodate a constant 
flow of labor migrants by tying immigration status to organizations of 
                                                      
276 See Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 100, at 1399. 
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transnational workers, rather than to employers or nations.281  Such a system 
is predicated on the recognition that migration flows have not been slowed 
by increased restrictiveness and enforcement; instead, these policies have 
only exposed migrants to abuses.282  It further recognizes that many labor 
migrants intend temporary migration283 and refuses to allow employers to 
control the conditions of migration.  
The concept of transnational labor citizenship could be applied to the 
particular reality of women labor migrants in order to ensure their access to 
membership in labor organizations and thus immigration status. In order to 
affect migration patterns through Mexico, and because women migrants 
often work in isolated and unregulated sectors,284 these organizations should 
be accessible from the country of origin.  Transnational labor organizations 
for particular industries where women labor migrants concentrate would 
allow these organizations to monitor and advocate for migration and labor 
conditions that reflect the unique experiences and needs of women migrants.  
By providing status from the country of origin, migration flows would be 
regularized and migrants’ vulnerability to organized crime would be 
reduced.  Tying migration status to women’s status as labor migrants 
responds both to the gendered impact of economic liberalization and 
restrictive immigration policies that foster the vulnerable migration patterns 
of women migrants.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The feminization of labor migration from and through Mexico to the 
United States has come at a horrific price. More than half of women 
migrants are sexual assaulted or raped and face a high risk of trafficking and 
sexual exploitation by criminal organizations.  After being propelled to 
international migration by economic liberalization, restrictive immigration 
policies push women migrants into illicit channels that increase their 
vulnerability to the corruption of state officials and the violence of organized 
criminal groups.  In light of these abuses, Mexico’s new Migration Law 
gives broad legal protection to the human rights of migrants and recognizes 
the vulnerability of women migrants.  However, applying a gender lens to 
the Migration Law reveals that the reform fails to create structures that will 
change the conditions of vulnerability for women migrants. While the law 
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missed opportunities to protect women migrants, Mexico could still 
implement changes to provide regular migration channels to transmigrants, a 
change that would make Mexico a regional leader in protecting the rights of 
women migrants.  As Mexico implements its Migration Law and 
immigration reform enters the political stage in the United States, the time is 
ripe for Mexico to lead the way to a coordinated regional policy that can 
prevent the abuses of women migrants in transit.  
 
